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 char  miller 
 The Once and Future Forest Service: 
Land-Management Policies and Politics in 
Contemporary America 
 Th e news from the Far North is not good. In the spring of 2007, University 
of Alberta scientists reported that portions of the Canadian tundra were 
transforming into new forests of spruce and shrubs much more rapidly 
than once was imaginable. “Th e conventional thinking on treeline dynam-
ics has been that advances are very slow because conditions are so harsh at 
these high latitudes and altitudes,” reported Dr. Ryan Danby, a member of 
the UA research team. “But what our data indicate is that there was an 
upslope surge of trees in response to warmer temperatures. It’s like [the for-
est] waited until conditions were just right, then it decided to get up and 
run, not just walk.” 1 
 Th e multifaceted impact of global climate change is chilling. As tundra 
converts to forest cover, species and their habitats must move higher up or die 
off . Sheep and caribou are already responding to the environmental transfor-
mation that has aff ected members of Canada’s First Nations, who are depen-
dent on these food sources. Moreover, the process feeds off  itself: trees absorb 
more light than tundra does and they emit that energy as heat, further warming 
the atmosphere and reinforcing the very conditions that allow more spruce to 
 An earlier version of this essay was originally presented as the Lynn W. Day Distinguished 
Lecture in Forest and Conservation History, Forest History Society and Duke University, 
November 9, 2006; and as a keynote address to the late November 2006 conference, 
“Challenges Facing the U.S. Forest Service: A Critical Review,” co-sponsored by the Uni-
versity of Montana’s Center for the Rocky Mountain West and the Cinnabar Foundation. 
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fl ourish on the formerly treeless terrain. “Th ese results are very relevant to the 
current debate surrounding climate change,” Professor Danby noted, “because 
they provide real evidence that vegetation change will be quite considerable in 
response to future warming.” 2 
 Th e scientifi c data, and their myriad implications, raise key questions 
about how human institutions will respond to a human-generated crisis. Th is 
is particularly relevant to those land-management agencies such as the U.S. 
Forest Service that are responsible for innumerable bioregions and ecozones. 
How will it steward its 193 million acres of forests and grasslands as the cli-
mate and landscape shift  in relation to one another? 3 
 Th at confounding question comes at a fascinating moment in the agen-
cy’s history. Established in 1905, in the immediate aft ermath of its centennial 
celebrations, the Forest Service found itself with a golden opportunity to con-
sider whether its prior commitments will allow it to celebrate its  bi centennial. 
Th at may seem an odd statement. Aft er all, the Forest Service has managed to 
weather serious challenges in the past, a legacy suggesting that it might prove 
as nimble when confronted with future trials, however unpredictable as those 
global warming may pose. Th at said, the agency’s history may not be a useful 
guide to a future layered with the dilemmas that a warmer earth is expected to 
produce. But however traumatic climate change may be, however disruptive 
its impact on the agency’s previous patterns of behavior and action, analyzing 
its past still may provide insight into its future. How will its leaders, line offi  -
cers, rangers, and staff  daily face complexities posed by an integrated series of 
forces that may overwhelm their capacity to manage landscapes? How will 
they respond to the welter of opportunities and challenges that already have 
emerged and will arise? Th ese are not just policy questions but also have a 
historical dimension, for as Richard Neustadt and Ernest May observe in 
 Th inking in Time: “Seeing the past can help one envision alternative futures.” 4 
 Th is article is concerned with some of the alternative futures that the U.S. 
Forest Service might face, in particular three possible paths that could rede-
fi ne its structure and mission. For the sake of clarity, I have segregated the 
three tracks, but in reality they might well merge or intersect at various points, 
a speculative approach that is designed to provoke a larger discussion about 
land management in an age of climate change. 
 scenario one: evolutionary dynamics 
 Th e Forest Service has evolved in relation to the lands that it manages, estab-
lishing a dynamic interaction between environment and the professional 
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conservationists who seek to manage it, which confi rms a broader claim: 
“History has repeatedly demonstrated that the health and welfare of human 
societies are fundamentally dependent on the health and welfare of their for-
ests.” Th is reciprocity, in its particularity and broad sweep, may prove the key 
to the agency’s long-term survival. Because over time it has had to adapt to 
shift s in political temper, scientifi c knowledge, and social concern, the agen-
cy’s legacy of resilience also may defi ne its twenty-fi rst-century behavior, 
enabling it to morph as required while retaining its core responsibilities and 
organizational structure. 5 
 Th e Forest Service’s creation depended on an argument about evolving 
landscapes. Th ree maps illustrating an article by William B. Greeley, the agen-
cy’s third chief, make the case. Entitled “Virgin Forest Cover: 1620, 1850, 
1920,” they tell a story of profound environmental change as the original for-
est cover of what would become the United States was cut down, and hints at 
the Forest Service’s mitigatory role. Early U.S. foresters believed that America 
in 1620 was virginal, so they could highlight the diff erences between those 
Euro-American settlers, farmers, and industrialists who slashed their way 
through ancient forests and latter-day Forest Service professionals, whose 
function was to protect and steward the remaining resources. 
 In political terms, the Forest Service produced such images to convince 
the nation that its work was critical to national security. To repair the land 
required an organization whose mission was to restore what had been 
destroyed. Replant, regenerate, repair: this would be the agency’s environ-
mental ethos for its fi rst forty years, from 1905 to 1945. 
 Yet embedded within that purpose was an intense anxiety, best captured 
in a 1908 cartoon: “Uncle Sam as He May Appear in Twenty Years.” It depicts 
a crew-cut Uncle Sam—with stumps standing in as hair stubble—who, like 
Sampson, has been shorn of his power, too weak to maintain his authority 
and expand his reach. Contemporaries understood that the United States was 
on the cusp of imperial dominance. By 1910, the American gross national 
product had exceeded the combined output of England, France, and Germany. 
Yet in recognizing that they had the chance to supplant Europe, many Ameri-
cans were also haunted by the specter that they would miss this opportunity 
by acting as other empires had—by consuming and devastating their natural 
resources at such a clip and to such an extent that their economy would 
collapse along with their dreams of hegemonic power. 6 
 Conservationists played a part in this wider cultural debate: their 
descriptions of forest devastation and the resultant “timber famine” dove-
tailed with their prescription—to create a system of public lands dedicated to 
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the practice of conservative resource management. This argument had 
emerged in the aft ermath of the publication of George Perkins Marsh’s semi-
nal work,  Man and Nature: Earth as Modifi ed by Human Action (1864), and it 
gained momentum in the 1870s and 1880s as the American Forestry Associa-
tion, fi shing and hunting clubs, and women’s groups agitated for regulatory 
mechanisms to control resource exploitation. Th eir agitation had an impact: 
in the 1870s, the Division of Forestry was created within the Department of 
Agriculture. In 1891, Congress passed the Forest Reserve Act, granting the 
president power “from time to time, [to] set apart and reserve in any State or 
Territory having public land bearing forests … public reservation.” Within a 
year, President Benjamin Harrison had set aside more than 13 million acres 
as forest reserves, and his successor, Grover Cleveland, added another 5 mil-
lion; by 1899, the number had swelled to 40 million. But it was not until 1897 
that administrative control over these reserves was codifi ed. 7 
 President Th eodore Roosevelt helped tip the balance in favor of conser-
vation. Between 1901 and 1908, he added 110 million acres to the National 
Forest System; he also signed off  on the transfer of these lands from the 
Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture, and he created 
the Forest Service and appointed Giff ord Pinchot as its fi rst chief. 
 In short order, Pinchot and his peers used their legislative mandate to 
train rangers to survey and map the lands within the boundaries of the 
national forests. Th ey also pressed for the resolution of legal challenges, which 
ultimately led to Supreme Court decisions affi  rming the Forest Service’s stat-
utory standing and authority to manage the forests and grasslands, and lob-
bied Congress for budget increases to match its expanded duties. 
 With the establishment of these boundaries—topographical, political, 
and legal—the Forest Service went to work on its central managerial task 
from 1905 until World War II, the regeneration of abused terrain in the west. 
During the Great Depression, its charge widened to include gullied southern 
farmlands. By World War II, the Forest Service’s engagement had proved 
national in scope and local in signifi cance; it had become the nation’s soft -
hatted custodial agent. 8 
 Th at hat hardened with the advent of global war and postwar prosperity. 
Th en its task was to get out the cut. In 1940, two billion board feet were har-
vested on the national forests; by 1960, the figure had zoomed upward, 
topping out at twelve billion board feet in the late 1980s. Th is shift  was of 
incalculable importance and is perhaps best refl ected in the controversies 
that erupted in the 1970s over clear-cutting on Montana’s Bitterroot National 
Forest and West Virginia’s Monongahela National Forest. For its supporters, 
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clear-cutting signaled the agency’s newfound ability to harvest trees in once-
diffi  cult terrain and its laudable ambition to turn natural forests into plantations. 
For its critics, this was a dire refl ection of the Forest Service’s technological 
fi xation. So intense did the debate become that even an internal task force 
chided agency employees on the Bitterroot for acting as if “resource produc-
tion goals come fi rst and … land management considerations take second 
place.” 9 
 Protests over clear-cutting and the technological imperative provoked a 
backlash against the Forest Service, sparking federal lawsuits, local demon-
strations, and a welter of state and congressional inquiries. When the dust 
had settled, a new legal environment had emerged. Among its most critical 
components was the 1976 National Forest Management Act (NFMA), which 
gave the public a much stronger role in determining forest planning and set 
strict limits on the Forest Service’s clear-cutting practices. 
 Th e NFMA was the last in a remarkable series of landmark environmen-
tal initiatives. Beginning with the 1964 Wilderness Act, and including the 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (1968), the National Environmental Policy Act 
(1970), the various Clean Air and Clean Water Act amendments of the 1970s, 
and the Endangered Species Act (1973), these bills constitute the second great 
wave of environmental activism. Th e end result has been that these initiatives 
regulate the very land-management regulatory agencies, such as the Forest 
Service and the National Park Service, that had been established during the 
fi rst surge of environmental legislation, craft ed in the Progressive Era. 
 Since these laws were adopted, the agency has appeared to be wandering 
in the forest. Pounded in federal court, faced with drastic budget cuts and 
sharp reductions in personnel, it has struggled to fi nd its way, leading one 
former chief to argue that it is mired in “analysis paralysis,” a logjam prevent-
ing it from doing its proper work. Complicating this struggle to defi ne its 
contemporary mission has been steep declines in timber harvests, escalating 
population pressures along the urban-wildland interface, increased recre-
ational use, intensifying forest fi res, and serious water-management issues. 
No wonder the agency’s morale is low. 10 
 Th e Forest Service’s initiatives refl ect this sometimes shaky sense of self. 
“New Perspectives,” the rubric it employed to describe its 1980s policy 
reforms, was succeeded by “Ecosystem Management” in the 1990s, which ten 
years later became the “Four Th reats,” Chief Dale Bosworth’s rhetorical device 
to describe the new century’s major environmental issues: the loss of open 
space, the buildup of fi re and fuels, invasive species, and unmanaged recre-
ation. Th e agency’s wavering commitments (real and perceived) are linked to 
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the larger culture’s curious inability to embody the environmental principles 
it purports to embrace. One example should suffi  ce: through legal pressure 
and political compromise, the public has forced the Forest Service to scale 
back its timber harvests, from twelve billion board feet in the late 1980s to two 
billion in 2007. Yet American demand for wood products has increased every 
year for the past fi ft y years. We have accomplished this by a simple expedient—
outsourcing demand to Canada, Eastern Europe, southern Africa, and the 
equatorial band of tropical rainforests, thus exporting our environmental 
problems to other, oft en poorer, parts of the planet. 11 
 Such myopia only roils the political context in which the Forest Service 
operates. As Giff ord Pinchot argued a century ago, the national forests “exist 
today because the people want them. To make them accomplish the most 
good the people themselves must make clear how they want them run.” Gain-
ing that clarity has been diffi  cult, hindering the agency’s ability to revise its 
land-management practices on the national forests. 
 Still, a persuasive case can be made that what has appeared to be a lack of 
coherent guidelines may simply be a necessary by-product of evolutionary 
change. It is tough to decipher, in the midst of a transition, the precise nature 
 of that transition. Th e agency’s history supports this view. Its management of 
resources, the emphasis of which has moved from grass to trees to water, has 
revealed its ability, however constrained, to shift  its ground, to adapt to 
changes in politics and polity, ideas and images. Th at is how all organisms 
survive. 
 scenario two: devolutionary progress 
 Yet sometimes the rate of change is so radical that organisms emerge as some-
thing else altogether. Indeed, a proposed alteration that the Forest Service has 
faced—and to date has fended off —is the devolution of its lands and author-
ity to the individual states in which its forests and grasslands are located. 
Th ose who have argued for this outcome have drawn on a powerful strain in 
American political thought, starting with the Tenth Amendment: “Th e pow-
ers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the States, are reserved for the States respectively, or to the people.” In 
attempting to defi ne the precise relationship between federal and state sover-
eignty, a central issue in the United States since the eighteenth century, the 
amendment actually makes clear that this relationship is in tension. Th e For-
est Service knows this full well, for the agency long has been a fl ashpoint in 
the heated political debate between states rights and national prerogatives. 
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 And with reason: in the early twentieth century, western critics of Presi-
dent Th eodore Roosevelt alleged that his creation of the Forest Service and 
the national forests were but a means to expand presidential authority. Th at is 
why they erupted in anger when he withdrew 110 million acres from the pub-
lic domain during his two administrations, sparking the fi rst Sagebrush 
Rebellion, which simmered between 1905 and 1908. Although the Supreme 
Court legitimized the agency’s managerial control of these lands (and thus 
implicitly supported Roosevelt’s actions) through a series of test cases resolved 
in 1911, its decisions did not defuse western resentment. In the 1950s, western 
livestock interests reignited the debate, but without success. No more suc-
cessful was the 1990s “Wise Use” movement, which demanded that the fed-
eral government relinquish its rights to the national forests. Commissioners 
in Nye County, Nevada, bulldozed Forest Service fences, and across the west 
agency vehicles and offi  ces were fi rebombed and vandalized. In this over-
heated environment, Pinchot, mocked in a 1908 cartoon entitled “Czar 
Pinchot and his Cossack Rangers,” would have felt right at home. 12 
 Although the states rights argument has never gained much traction in 
the United States, it did in Canada and New Zealand, and an analysis of these 
other countries’ experiences helps to set American land-management prac-
tices in an international context. Originally, each had followed a similar path 
as the United States: in a federalized structure in which national and provin-
cial governments maintained diff erent levels of sovereignty, each country 
established a national forest system under the management of a professional 
forest service. Like the U.S. Forest Service, the Canadian and New Zealand 
agencies were expected to oversee and maintain their valuable resource base. 
Th at expectation is not surprising. Giff ord Pinchot had been a strong propo-
nent of the Canadian conservation movement, and all three societies had 
adapted European ideas on how to regulate resource exploitation. Linked at 
their creation, it would have been reasonable to suppose that the futures of 
these three professional agencies also would have run in tandem. 
 Th at is not what happened. Founded in 1899, the Canadian Forest Ser-
vice developed simultaneously with schools of forestry. Th e fi rst of these, at 
the University of Toronto, was directed by German-born forester Bernhard 
Fernow, who had recently resigned as head of the U.S. Division of Forestry. 
Th e graduates of these schools joined the new agency’s staff , and their sci-
entifi c expertise shaped the organization’s managerial perspective; by 1924, 
Canadian foresters had 9.2 million acres under management. Within six 
years, this short-lived experiment in federal forestry was over. In 1930, as 
the depression bore down, all national forest lands were returned to the 
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provinces from which they had been appropriated originally, and the agency’s 
budget and staff  were cut drastically. Th e concept of a national agency with 
land-management regulatory control never recovered. Over the years, the 
Canadian Forest Service’s bureaucratic status has been downgraded from an 
agency to a department, from a service to a division. It regained its depart-
mental status in 1989, but a decade earlier had lost a critical part of its 
research responsibilities when its forest products laboratories were priva-
tized. Because it no longer has a land base or a scientifi c mission, the Cana-
dian Forest Service now serves as a “navigator” for private and provincial 
foresters and forests. Its mission statement refl ects this change in function: 
“Th e Canadian Forest Service promotes the sustainable development of 
Canada’s forests and the competitiveness of the Canadian forest sector.” Not 
everyone has been happy with its new role as a promoter or catalyst. As Ken 
Druska and Bob Burt have observed, at “various points in its history, some 
of its leaders or its critics have looked wistfully at its southern counterpart, 
the U.S. Forest Service, with its vast national forest base, and its authorita-
tive position in U.S. society.” 13 
 New Zealand showed no such wistfulness when in the 1980s it embarked 
on an even more rapid devolution of its public forests. Th e nation’s central 
role in forestry had begun seven decades earlier. In 1913, aft er nearly a century 
of largely unregulated and intense harvesting of native forests, a Royal Com-
mission on Forestry was appointed to evaluate forest conditions, determine 
which lands would remain in pubic control, defi ne their purposes, and esti-
mate future demand for timber and other resources. Th e commission con-
cluded that New Zealand needed a commissioner of forestry and a professional 
forest service that would manage the state-owned woods. Although World 
War I delayed the implementation of these recommendations, by 1920 they 
were enacted, new schools of forestry were established, and management 
commenced. Sixty years later, the national government owned more than 50 
percent of New Zealand’s commercial forests and it dominated the national 
timber economy. 
 By 2000, that was no longer true: the government owned only 6 percent 
of commercial forestland, 34 percent was held by Maori trusts, 3 percent was 
under local control, and the largest ownership group was international tim-
ber companies. Corporate, for-profi t forestry now was the law of the land. 
 Why and how had this rapid transition occurred? In 1986, the Labour 
government, responding to the country’s sluggish economy, fi rst corporatized, 
then privatized, the resource agencies. One year later, the New Zealand Forest 
Service was abolished and folded into a new Department of Conservation. 
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Th e new Ministry of Forestry was, like its Canadian peer, to serve as a policy 
shop, and the New Zealand Forestry Corporation gained control of the state’s 
commercial forestry operations on 4.4 million hectares, focusing on market-
driven resource management and the creation of a profi table forest sector. 14 
 Neither the Canadian nor the New Zealand model has been seriously 
advocated in the United States. True, those who would like to reduce or elimi-
nate the U.S. Forest Service’s regulatory clout have proposed transferring the 
national forests to the states. But this proposal does not resemble the Cana-
dian experience of returning lands to the provinces; the U.S. national forests 
had always been federal property. Neither is it clear that the various states in 
which national forests are sited would welcome a complete dismantling of the 
federal presence. Th ey might not have the budgets, staff , or political will to 
maintain these invaluable lands. 15 
 Much more plausible are calls for the creation of a cooperative conserva-
tion strategy in which local groups and federal land managers together 
develop forest plans. Th is has a historical basis, too: Circular 21 (1898), which 
promoted the agency’s cooperation with private landowners, found its ana-
logue in other initiatives that encouraged forest rangers to discuss with local 
communities and economic interests how best to manage the forests. More 
recently, cooperative actions have been nurtured by the National Forest 
Management Act and the Endangered Species Act, which require public 
participation and interagency coordination. Th ey have also been energized 
by community environmental initiatives promoted at the 1997 Seventh 
American Forest Congress. Bolstered by university-sponsored think-tanks, 
such as the Public Policy Research Institute at the University of Montana, 
they have launched several successful ventures, including the Quincy Library 
Group (1992) and the New Ranch program developed by the Quivira Coali-
tion (1997). The latter seeks to operate within what it calls the “radical 
center—a neutral place where people could explore their interests instead of 
argue their positions—and at the grassroots, literally the ‘grass’ and the ‘roots,’ 
where, we believed, trust needed to be built anew.” 16 
 Th e “Lubrecht Conversations,” held outside Missoula, Montana, in 
1998, shared this commitment to a “bottom-up” approach to national-policy 
reform. Local consensus management would evolve to include wider water-
shed and bioregional perspectives that then would shape the national agenda. 
Most captivating was the group’s call for the creation of a “virtual” Region 7 
within the Forest Service wherein districts and forests would propose “to 
develop practical collaborative decision-making processes at the local/
regional level, which might eventually evolve into a national restatement of 
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basic mission.” If acceptable, the Forest Service would fund the experiment 
but would not retain authority over its design or implementation. 17 
 Although to date “Region 7” remains but a tantalizing idea, other experi-
mental formats have been enacted. One on-the-ground example is the Valles 
Caldera Trust (2000), a government-owned entity that provides management 
and administrative services for the Valles Caldera National Preserve in north-
ern New Mexico. Th is national preserve suggests the array of options that 
have been emerging in timber towns and ranch country in response to 
decades of political discord, legal wrangling, and bureaucratic entanglement. 
Th is development received another push in August 2005, when the White 
House Conference on Cooperative Conservation convened, a sign that com-
munity-oriented, collaborative conservation has captured considerable polit-
ical interest and generated signifi cant momentum. 18 
 Whether this top-down support of grass-roots actions will be manifest in 
long-term reform is uncertain. But the incremental development, innovative 
perspectives, and experimental character of these projects give them a much 
greater chance of success in revising the reigning principles of public land 
management in the United States than anything advocated by the Wise Use 
movement or modeled in the devolutionary actions of Canada and New 
Zealand. 19 
 scenario three: revolutionary impulse 
 Th e creation of a new Department of Conservation in the executive branch, 
by contrast, would expand the federal managerial presence and its regulatory 
authority. With a seat in the cabinet, this department would house the nation’s 
most important land-management agencies—the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Forest 
Service, the Geological Survey, the National Resources Conservation Service, 
and the National Park Service, among other entities. By creating economies 
of scale and greater effi  ciencies of action, this new department would save 
money and would serve as a standard bearer for the modern environmental 
movement. 
 Such an approach fl ies in the face of contemporary environmentalism, 
which stresses local agency over national solutions. Yet an unrefl ective dis-
missal of this possibility may lead conservationists to miss a chance to restruc-
ture federal land-management institutions and their delivery of environmental 
services. It may turn out that the most eff ective way to secure much-desired 
bottom-up reform is through simultaneous top-down change. 
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 Th at said, none of the previous eff orts to establish a Department of Con-
servation has been successful. When the Forest Service was created in 1905, it, 
like its progenitor, the Bureau of Forestry, was located in the Department of 
Agriculture. Th e nation’s forests, however, were administered in the Depart-
ment of the Interior. To bring the foresters and the forests together, Giff ord 
Pinchot faced two choices: shift  his tiny staff  to Interior, to be united there 
with the national forest reserves, or seek the transfer of millions of forested 
acres from one cabinet department to another. Because he was convinced that 
Interior’s history of corruption would compromise the newly formed Forest 
Service, he chose the latter path. Seven years aft er he inaugurated discussions 
in 1898, Congress and Interior signed off  on the transfer. 
 Th e Department of the Interior has been trying to recover these lost acres 
ever since. In the 1920s, Interior secretary Albert Fall pushed for the transfer 
of the Forest Service and its forests, but he failed when he was implicated in 
and later jailed for his participation in the Teapot Dome scandal. Ten years 
later, Harold Ickes, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s innovative and pugnacious secre-
tary of the Interior, proposed a Department of Conservation as part of a 
broader New Deal scheme to reorganize the executive branch. His bid revolved 
around moving the Forest Service and national forests to Interior and pulling 
in other federal land-management agencies under one roof. Th is restructur-
ing, he believed, would enable those who worked on soils to talk with those 
who worked with trees, hydrologists with botanists. In trying to fi nesse turf 
wars, Ickes ignited a contentious political brawl that damaged the Roosevelt 
administration. 20 
 In anticipation of such potential problems, President Roosevelt had 
informed Secretary of Agriculture Harry A. Wallace in 1933–34 that he must 
not publicly protest or privately fi ght the Forest Service’s impending transfer. 
Roosevelt also required Wallace to gag Ferdinand Silcox, chief of the Forest 
Service. Th rough back channels, Silcox asked sixty-eight-year-old Giff ord 
Pinchot to come to the agency’s aid, a request Pinchot gladly accepted. Over 
the next seven years, Pinchot and Ickes engaged in a titanic struggle inside 
and outside Washington. Over the radio, through newspaper columns, and 
before any audience that would listen to them, the former friends blasted 
each other. Pinchot’s reasoning was simple: if he whipped up a storm of pro-
test, he might force the president to recalibrate the costs associated with Ickes’s 
concept. By the late 1930s, aft er pouring tens of thousands of dollars of his 
money into the campaign and creating an aggressive lobbying force of fellow 
conservationists and western legislators, Pinchot forced Roosevelt to capitu-
late. In 1940, while meeting with the so-called Forest Lobby, a group of senators 
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and representatives from timber-producing states, Roosevelt tore up the 
executive order authorizing the transfer of the Forest Service. 
 Although Pinchot frustrated Ickes’s plans, the two men’s battle royal 
obscured a larger issue: what was the best way to organize the management of 
the public lands? Would Ickes’s vision of an integrated Department of Con-
servation have provided a more comprehensive leadership for and effi  cient 
stewardship of the nation’s forests, rivers, and grasslands? We will never know, 
but the alluring idea of a unifi ed conservation department has continued to 
attract adherents. In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration, at the same 
time it advocated the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
pushed for the establishment of a Department of Natural Resources that 
would have been merged with Interior. Th e idea failed in part because Russell 
Train, head of the Environmental Protection Agency, argued against it. “Th ere 
was some logic [to the idea,]” he recalled in 2006, “but I testifi ed against it, 
against building a bigger bureaucracy. I was opposed to burying environmen-
tal responsibility in a big conglomeration with everything from Indian aff airs 
to reclamation. Th e environment would have been submerged.” 21 
 Undaunted, President Jimmy Carter also fl oated the idea of a Depart-
ment of Natural Resources in concert with his plan to create a Department of 
Energy; each would absorb disparate agencies and off er a more cost-eff ective 
and integrated management. Energy became a cabinet-level position in 1977, 
but Natural Resources did not get beyond the discussion stage. 22 
 Despite the failure of these various presidents to create a conservation 
superagency, there are signs that an integration of agency function is under 
way. In 1997, Congress authorized a program called Service First: Working 
Together, in which the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management 
were authorized to merge various functions. One such joint venture is the 
Durango Public Lands Center. Th rough it, the two agencies manage their 
lands in southwestern Colorado. Th e leadership of the San Juan National For-
est and the San Juan Field BLM Offi  ce, like the twelve-person staff , is “cross 
delegated.” Because each employee is responsible for “all aspects of the two 
agencies’ work and is equally responsible to the USFS Regional Forester and 
BLM State Director,” because each is required to be fl uent in both agencies’ 
statutory regulations and wears the two uniforms, this is an innovative, even 
unusual, arrangement. Th e San Juan is “the only organization in the country 
with a single team providing leadership in all aspects of land management 
and public service for the two federal agencies.” 23 
 Th ese interchanges are part of a larger attempt to merge scarce skills and 
resources among the nation’s land-management agencies. Forest policy expert 
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Sally K. Fairfax has argued that more should be done to facilitate the conver-
gence of the identities and missions of these agencies. Noting that “the his-
toric distinctions and feuds” between the Forest Service, the National Park 
Service, and the Bureau of Land Management “no longer matter,” she observes: 
“Th e hostility between the advocates of forest reserves and park reserves that 
began before either agency was formed conceals the fact that for most of their 
existence, they have been more alike than not. As timber fades as a Forest 
Service preoccupation, and recreation emerges as dominant [in] present and 
future concerns, the justifi cations for having multiple and distinct federal 
management agencies fade as well.” 24 
 Lending further credence to her argument is a November 2006 Memo-
randum of Understanding that the Bureau of Land Management and the For-
est Service signed in partnership with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
National Park Service. It committed the four agencies “to carry out shared or 
joint management activities to achieve mutually benefi cial resource manage-
ment goals.” Service First authority has been utilized primarily for merging 
offi  ces, issuing joint permits, sharing management, and creating single points 
of contact for resource programs. Given the patchwork of lands each agency 
manages and the proximity of their holdings, this integrative approach makes 
considerable sense, so much so that the Bureau of Indian Aff airs, the Bureau 
of Reclamation, and the Army Corps of Engineers are considering seeking 
Service First authorization. In this incremental fashion, the dream of a 
Department of Conservation that has eluded several presidents and innu-
merable policy analysts might well come into being. 25 
 future focus 
 Separately, none of the three scenarios sketched out here—evolution, devo-
lution, revolution—will have much chance of redefi ning the Forest Service’s 
twenty-fi rst-century structure or its guiding perspectives. None of these 
possibilities will be achieved without reference to or in combination with 
the others. Moreover, although any change in the agency’s land-manage-
ment mission will require internal support from the leadership and staff  of 
the Forest Service, the real locus of any such transformation lies in Con-
gress and the executive branch. Th at is what Roger Sedjo, senior fellow at 
Resources for the Future, had in mind when he noted in 2000 that the For-
est Service “no longer controls national forest policy. Instead, mandatory 
provisions of the law and regulations … mean that the regional and local 
landscapes, watersheds, and their resources are now the focus of attention.” 
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Because the assessments of the viability of these resources shape policy, the 
Forest Service and other public land-management agencies now “lack the 
institutional capacity and authority to fully develop and implement ecosys-
tem conservation agendas and resource management programs.” Th at these 
organizations lack the necessary clout is tied to their inability “to interpret 
and respond eff ectively to the public’s priorities regarding national forest 
management.” 26 
 To regain the capacity to listen to the citizenry and address its varied con-
cerns, the Forest Service needs only to recall the words Giff ord Pinchot uttered 
in 1907, when the nation’s forest reserves were renamed the national forests. 
Th ese public lands were, he asserted, “made for and owned by the people. Th ey 
should also be managed by the people. … Th is means that if National Forests 
are going to accomplish anything worthwhile the people must know all about 
them and must take a very active role in their management.” 
 Despite his conviction that democratic debate was essential to public 
land management, Pinchot knew that the collaborative process of defi ning 
and achieving conservation stewardship of the national forests would never 
be easy. He also knew that that was the only way to safeguard these precious 
assets, a matter of even more pressing obligation in this vexing climate of 
change. 
 Pomona College 
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